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Abstract 
Purpose - 
We investigate if financial development benefits from financial globalisation are questionable 
until certain thresholds of financial globalisation are attained.  
 
Design/methodology/approach - 
Financial globalisation is proxied with Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows as a percentage of 
GDP (FDIgdp) whereas financial development entails dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and 
size. The empirical evidence is based on; (i) data from 53 African countries for the period 2000-
2011 and (ii) interactive Generalised Method of Moments with forward orthogonal deviations.  
 
Findings- 
The following findings are established. First, thresholds of FDIgdp from which financial 
globalisation increases money supply are 20.50 and 16.00 for below- and above-median sub-
samples of financial globalisation respectively. Second, FDIgdp thresholds from which financial 
globalisation increases banking system activity and financial system activity for below-median 
sub-samples of financial globalisation are 13.81 and 13.29 respectively. Third, for financial size, 
there is evidence of: (i) a positive threshold of 21.30 in the full sample and (ii) consistent 
increasing returns without a modifying threshold for the above-median sub-sample. 
 
Practical implications- 
Evidence of a positive threshold implies that while the initial effect of financial globalisation on 
financial development is negative, there is a positive marginal effect, such that at a certain level 
of FDIgdp (or threshold), the overall effect of financial globalisation on the given financial 
development dynamic becomes positive.  It follows that financial globalisation is both negative 
and positive for financial development, with a U-shaped relationship. Therefore the appropriate 
role of policy should neither be to stem the tide of capital flows nor to encourage them, but to 
understand what levels or thresholds of capital flows are required to benefit domestic financial 
development.  
 
Originality/value- 
We have extended the debate on initial or threshold conditions for the financial development 
benefits from financial globalisation by providing policy makers with levels of FDI (as 
percentage of GDP) that are required to start materialising financial development benefits from 
financial globalisation.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The recent financial crisis has resurfaced the debate over threshold conditions for benefits 
from financial globalisation (Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014). There is some moderate 
consensus in theoretical and empirical literature on the need for some initial conditions before 
development rewards from financial openness can be materialised. The narratives include, inter 
alia: potential risks of opening capital accounts without initial requirements (Kose et al., 2011), 
the need for country-specific characteristics in financial openness strategies (Prasad and Rajan, 
2008) and questionable benefits from financial globalisation in domestic financial development
1
 
(Henry, 2007).  
While from theoretical underpinnings, financial globalisation is appealing as a means to 
international risk sharing and efficient allocation of capital, there are growing strands in the 
literature questioning the thesis for greater benefits in less developed countries
2
 (Kose et al., 
2006; Kose et al., 2011). These anti-theses include among others: complete account liberalisation 
as a substantial drawback to global financial stability (Stiglitz, 2000; Bhagwati, 1998; Rodrik, 
1998) and a hidden agenda of extending the benefits of international trade in goods to assets 
(Asongu, 2014). Conversely, some empirical literature from the thesis sustain that growing 
financial liberalisation has enabled transitions from low- to middle-income in many countries 
while at the same time substantially enhancing economic stability in developed nations 
(Summers, 2000; Fischer, 1998). 
The hypothesis/conjecture on stability of advanced nations has been seriously called to 
question in the wake of the recent global financial meltdown. This has reignited the heated 
debate on the merits of financial globalisation in financial development, with some scholars 
openly professing that the hypothesis of recent financial engineering generating substantial gains 
is less convincing (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009). During the crisis, developing countries 
                                                          
1
 We use the terms ‘financial development’ and ‘domestic financial development’ interchangeably throughout this 
study.  
2
 According to the theoretical underpinnings, less developed countries are comparatively lacking in capital but rich 
in labour. Hence, access to foreign capital is a means to increasing investment and therefore economic prosperity. 
On the other hand, developed nations have less volatile output than developing countries, which enhances potential 
gains from the latter (Kose et al., 2011).  
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which earlier experienced surges in flows of capital have had to witness a sharp decrease in the 
same flows (Kose et al., 2011).  The positions of Kose et al. (2011) and Henry (2007) are 
broadly consistent with a growing stream of post-crisis African literature (Price and Elu, 2014; 
Motelle and Biekpe, 2015; Asongu, 2014).  Price and Elu (2014) have recently concluded that 
credit contraction during the 2008-2009 financial crises had more adverse growth consequences 
on sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries which are members of the CFA (French African 
Colonies) monetary union. Motelle and Biekpe (2015) have also investigated the hypothesis that 
deeper financial integration is a source of domestic financial instability in the financial sector 
and confirmed the hypothesis within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Asongu (2014) has investigated whether financial initial conditions are necessary to materialise 
the rewards of financial globalisation in Africa to conclude that only financial threshold 
conditions of size are necessary to enjoy the domestic financial development rewards of financial 
globalisation. Moreover, while the hypothesis is only partially valid for financial depth, it not 
confirmed for financial dynamics of efficiency and activity.  
The present line of inquiry aims to extend the above stream of literature by investigating 
financial globalisation dynamic thresholds for financial development in African countries. In 
essence, it investigates what levels of financial openness are needed to enjoy the financial 
development benefits of financial globalisation. Its main contribution to the literature is to 
indirectly investigate the Henry (2007) and Kose et al. (2011)
3
 hypothesis within the context of 
African countries. By indirect, we aim to articulate financial globalisation thresholds instead of 
financial development thresholds, required for financial globalisation to benefit domestic 
financial development.   Essentially, we assess at what thresholds a hypothetically negative 
effect of financial globalisation on financial development becomes positive. Understanding such 
thresholds has relevant policy implications because the role of policy has either been to 
encourage or discourage capital inflows (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009, pp.16-17; Asongu, 
2014, p. 166). But limiting the policy challenge exclusively to a bipolar debate (of either 
increasing or decreasing capital inflows) is misleading because the effects of financial 
globalisation on development outcomes could be positive or negative, depending on certain 
                                                          
3
 “In this paper we develop a unified empirical framework for characterizing such threshold conditions. We find that 
there are clearly identifiable thresholds in variables such as financial depth and institutional quality: the cost-
benefit trade-off from financial openness improves significantly once these threshold conditions are satisfied” (Kose 
et al., 2011, p.147).  
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thresholds of financial globalisation.  Hence, it is essential for policy makers to know what levels 
of capital flows are required to either promote or reduce financial development.  
The study in the literature closest to the current paper is Asongu (2014). Therefore, we 
devote space to clarifying how the positioning of this line of inquiry steers clear of underlying 
study. Significant differences that advance the extant of knowledge in the debate are at least 
fourfold, namely: (i) underpinning hypothesis and threshold variable, (ii) conception of 
threshold, (iii) sample and periodicity and (v) methodology. First, the underlying hypothesis on 
threshold for the benefit from financial globalisation is indirect because it focuses on financial 
globalisation instead of financial development. Second, the conception and definition of 
threshold are aligned with a cut-off point in the financial globalisation variable. In essence, a 
financial development threshold in Asongu is established based on consistent significance of 
financial globalisation with either increasing positive magnitude or decreasing negative 
magnitude, throughout the conditional distribution of financial development. Third, on the 
sample and periodicity, whereas, the underlying paper is limited to 15 African countries for the 
period 1996-2009, we focus on 53 African countries for the period 2000-2011. Fourth, contrary 
to quantile regressions which involve assessing the relevance of financial globalisation 
throughout the conditional distributions of financial development dynamics, we employ an 
endogeneity-robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal 
deviations as opposed to differencing. In order to avail room for more policy implications, we 
further condition the investigated nexus on above- and below-median levels of financial 
globalisation.  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 engages views, conflicts and the 
agenda of this line of inquiry. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. Section 4 
presents the results and discussion. Section 5 concludes with implications and further directions.  
 
2. Views, Conflicts and Agenda 
  
 The decision on whether to make a transition from a closed capital account regime to an 
open or liberalised one has been an issue of intense debate and controversy. According to 
Asongu (2014), there are two main perspectives on the policy relevance of capital account 
lateralisation in developing countries.  
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 The first stream on ‘allocation efficiency’ is substantially motivated by underpinnings of 
the neoclassical growth model developed by Solow (1956). Accordingly, the neoclassical model 
supposes that capital account liberalisation facilitates the efficient allocation of international 
resources. In essence, it entails capital resource flow to capital-scarce developing countries from 
capital-abundant developed countries where the return of capital is relatively low.  In developing 
countries, corresponding positive externalities include, inter alia: reduced cost of capital, 
increased investment and pro-poor growth that is needed to raise living standards (Obstfeld, 
1998; Fischer, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; Summers, 2000; Batuo and Asongu, 2015). In line with the 
narrative, over the past decades, many developing countries have used these arguments on 
potential rewards to justify capital account liberalisation policies.  
 There is another stream of the literature which simply considers the justification of 
allocation efficiency as a fanciful means of extending the gains from international trade in goods 
to international trade in assets. According to this sceptical perspective, the hypothesis of 
‘allocation efficiency’ is feasible only if the domestic economies do not experience volatilities, 
with the exception of barriers to the free movement of capital. Given distortions and volatilities 
experienced by developing countries in recent decades, sceptics have begun arguing that the 
theoretical appeals of capital account liberalisation do not converge with the practical reality of 
capital account openness (Batuo and Asongu, 2015). As far as we have reviewed, these sceptical 
perspectives can best be articulated by Rodrik (1998) and Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) with 
provocative titles like ‘Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?’ and ‘Why Did Financial 
Globalization Disappoint?’ respectively. According to Rodrik (1998), there is no relationship 
between capital openness and the rate of investment or growth in developing countries. The 
author has concluded that while the rewards to capital openness are difficult to establish, the 
costs of financial globalisation are increasingly apparent with recurrent global financial crises: 
ever increasing in magnitude and frequency. Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) have concluded 
that, the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States of America (USA), the subsequent global 
financial crisis and economic meltdown have resurfaced doubts about the economic benefits of 
recent advances in financial engineering.  
 The sceptical positions of Rodrik (1998) and Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) are broadly 
consistent with the conclusions of Asongu (2015) from a Meta analysis on the finance-growth 
nexus. The author argues that the theoretical justifications for ‘allocation efficiency’ in growing 
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financial globalisation are increasingly becoming practically irrelevant due to the frequency of 
financial crisis. In essence, increasing financial instability bears an inverse relationship with 
conducive macroeconomic conditions for sustained economic growth, notably: quick 
mobilization of productive savings, efficient resource allocation, enhancement of risk sharing 
and mitigation of information asymmetry.  According Asongu (p.624), relative to Schumpeter’s 
era, the appeals of finance on economic prosperity today are not apparent because of the 
increasing frequency of global financial crisis. This narrative is consistent with Eichengreen and 
Bordo (2002) and Buckle (2009): “The modern era of globalisation has been associated with 
significant economic transformation around the world, but also an increasing frequency of 
financial crises. According to Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) there were 39 national or 
international financial crises between 1945 and 1973. Their frequency increased to 139 between 
1973 and 1997, culminating in the Asian financial crisis. These crises occurred predominantly, 
but not exclusively, in emerging economies” (Buckle, 2009, p. 36). 
 Even prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, a consensus was already emerging among 
macroeconomists that developing countries needed to completely adopt capital account 
liberalisation policies. Some notable proponents included: (i) Dornbusch’s 1996 and 1997 
advocacies and (ii) Stanley Fischer’s famous speech during the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)’s Annual Meeting in 1997 (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009). Dornbusch (1996) 
considered capital controls as “an idea who’s time had past” and reaffirmed his position two 
years later that “the correct answer to the question of capital mobility is that it ought to be 
unrestricted” (Dornbusch, 1998, p. 20). Fischer (1997) after presenting a solid case for financial 
globalisation, made recommendations for amendment to IMF’s articles, which required an 
orderly openness of capital accounts. While there are obvious risks associated with capital 
account openness, Fischer believed benefits far outweighed corresponding costs. Following 
Fischer’s prophesy and Dornbusch’s thesis, the plethora of works that have focused on the 
rewards of capital account openness have painted mixed and paradoxical pictures (Rodrik and 
Subramanian, 2009). To the best of our knowledge, one of the most exhaustive reviews of the 
literature has concluded that the cross-country evidence on positive development outcomes from 
financial liberalisation has been inconclusive on the one hand and lacking in robustness on the 
other hand (Kose et al., 2006).   
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An extensive literature has been surveyed by Kose et al. (2006). The authors have 
provided an alternative framework to assessing the macroeconomic implications of capital 
account openness in order to reconcile available evidence and strands of the debate. While, these 
authors have confirmed documented theoretical underpinnings of financial globalisation (inter 
alia, financial market development, macroeconomic policy discipline and enhanced public and 
corporate governance), they have also sustained that indirect benefits are more relevant than 
traditional financial mechanisms articulated in previous studies. As an extension of the 
underlying study, Kose et al. (2011) have revisited the issues in the post-crisis era to establish 
that developing countries that reflect greater openness to some categories of financial flows but 
on a whole less dependent on foreign capital (because of greater reliance on domestic savings for 
investment purposes), have averagely enjoyed higher levels of economic growth performance. 
This position is consistent with recent discussions in policy making and scholarly circles on 
China being de facto open and de jure closed (Prasad and  Wei, 2007; Shah and Patnaik, 2009; 
Aizenman and Glick, 2009; Asongu, 2013)
4
. From a broader perspective, even beyond financial 
crisis, the rewards of financial globalisation are increasingly blur because it is inter alia: 
increasing external debt flows that are worsening business cycles (Leung, 2003), not increasing 
efficiency and productivity (Mulwa et al., 2009) and fuelling inequality (Azzimonti et al., 2014).   
In light of the above, there has been a growing debate that certain initial conditions in 
financial and institutional development are essential for the financial development benefits from 
financial globalisation (Asongu, 2014). According to the narrative, advanced countries with 
better institutional development, deeper financial markets and more stable macroeconomic 
policies (relative to developing countries), have been the principal beneficiaries of financial 
globalisation. According to Rodrik and Subramanian (2009), this asymmetric benefit has 
motivated many authors to argue that developing countries ought to first concentrate on 
strengthening domestic financial markets and institutional capacity building before completely 
liberalising their capital accounts. How to balance these considerations against potential rewards 
is the focus of the present line of inquiry.  
 This study aims to assess financial globalisation dynamic thresholds for financial 
development in developing countries. While in the introduction we have clearly articulated how 
                                                          
4
 The de facto and de jure measures of financial globalisation are foreign direct investment and KAOPEN (from 
Chinn and Ito, 2002) respectively.  
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this line of inquiry contributes to existing literature, it is important to engage how the positioning 
of the inquiry is consistent with the cautions of Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) engaged in this 
section. The authors have sustained that financial globalisation has not yielded increased 
investment and higher levels of economic prosperity in developing countries because emerging 
countries that have enjoyed substantial economic prosperity in recent decades have surprisingly 
been those which have been the least reliant on capital inflows. They further advocate that 
contemporary evidences on the economic rewards of financial globalisation are speculative, 
indirect and ultimately unpersuasive. According to these authors, it is high time for a new 
financial globalization paradigm that recognizes that more is not necessarily better. “As long as 
the world economy remains politically divided among different sovereign and regulatory 
authorities, global finance is condemned to suffer from deformation far worse than those of 
domestic finance. Depending on the context and country, the appropriate role of policy will be as 
often to stem the tide of capital flows as to encourage them. Policymakers who view their 
challenges exclusively from the latter perspective will get it badly wrong” (Rodrik and 
Subramanian, 2009, pp. 16-17). 
 A direct policy syndrome from the above account is the pressing challenge of 
understanding what thresholds of financial globalisation are essential to materialise development 
benefits of financial globalisation. Given that the discussed theoretical underpinnings of capital 
account openness are consistent with the potential benefit of allocation efficiency, our study 
focuses on financial allocation efficiency. Financial allocation efficiency is also the ratio of 
financial activity (credit) and financial depth (deposits) when most dimensions of the Financial 
Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank are incorporated. Hence, in 
order to avail room for more policy implications we employ all financial intermediary 
dimensions identified by the FDSD. This study contributes to the engaged literature by putting 
some empirical structure on the concept of thresholds for the benefit of financial globalisation. It 
steers clear of the direct focus on domestic thresholds or initial conditions: (i) hypothesized by 
Kose et al. (2011) and Henry (2007) and (ii) empirically engaged by Asongu (2014).  
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3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data  
 We investigate a panel of 53 African countries with data for the period 2000-2011 from 
African Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) of the World Bank. Limiting the scope to Africa is consistent with Asongu (2014), 
which we are extending. In line with the underlying study, the dependent variables are financial 
development dynamics of depth (at overall economic and financial system levels)
5
, efficiency 
(banking and financial system efficiency)
6
, activity (banking and financial system activity)
7
 and 
size
8
. Accordingly, with the exception of financial size for which an alternative variable with a 
high degree of substitution is not available in the FDSD (to the best of our knowledge), two 
measures are used for financial dynamics of depth, efficiency and activity, for robustness 
purposes.  
 Consistent with the engaged literature, financial globalisation is measured with net 
foreign direct investment inflows (FDI) (Henry, 2007; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009; Asongu, 
2014) and control variables entail: economic prosperity (GDP growth), inflation, public 
                                                          
5
 “Borrowing from the FDSD, this paper measures financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system 
perspectives with indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. 
While the former denotes the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits, the later indicates liquid 
liabilities. Since we are dealing exclusively with developing countries, we distinguish liquid liabilities from money 
supply because a substantial chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector” (Asongu, 
2014, p. 189).  The two proxies which are in ratios of GDP (see Appendix 1) can robustly cross-check each other as 
either account for over 97.4% of information in the other (see Appendix 3). 
6
 “By financial intermediation efficiency here, this study neither refers to the profitability-oriented concept nor to 
the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: 
DEA). What we seek to highlight is the ability of banks to effectively fulfill their fundamental role of transforming 
mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators (agents). We adopt proxies for banking-system-efficiency and 
financial-system-efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on 
financial system deposits: Fcfd’)” (Asongu, 2014, pp.189-190). Like with financial depth, these two financial 
allocation efficiency indictors have a degree of substitution of 86.80% (see Appendix 3). Hence, one can be used to 
check the consistency of the other. According to Chen (1996), FDI location decisions are substantially determined 
by allocation efficiency.   
7
 “By financial intermediary activity here, the work highlights the ability of banks to grant credit to economic 
operators.  We proxy for both banking intermediary activity and financial intermediary activity with “private 
domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions: 
Pcrbof” respectively” (Asongu, 2014, p. 190). In light of Appendix 3, the two measures can be used to cross-check 
one another.  
8
 According to the FDSD, financial intermediary size is measured as the ratio of “deposit bank assets” to “total 
assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets: Dbacba).  
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investment, foreign aid and trade openness. These control variables have been substantially 
documented in the financial development literature (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Saint 
Paul, 1992; Levine, 1997; Huyben and Smith, 1999; Boyd et al., 2001; Levine, 2003ab; Fielding, 
2004; Do and Levchenko, 2004; Huang and Temple, 2005; Huang, 2011).  
 We devote space to engaging expected signs of the control variables in substantive detail.  
First, macroeconomic policies conducive to low and stable inflation, higher levels of investment 
and openness to trade, have been documented to  be associated with higher levels of financial 
development. Both theoretical (Huybens and Smith, 1999) and empirical (Boyd et al., 2001 ) 
perspectives sustain that higher levels inflation are linked to smaller, less efficiency and less 
active equity markets and financial intermediary institutions. Huang (2011) has established the 
positive nexus between investment and financial development in an increasingly globalised 
world. There is some consensus on the view that policies that are favourable to openness in 
external trade attract financial development (Do and Levchenko, 2004; Huang and Temple, 
2005). Hence, we expect public investment and trade to display positive signs, while inflation 
should reflect a negative relationship.  Second, the positive nexus between economic growth and 
financial development has also been abundantly covered. As sustained by Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) and Saint-Paul (1992), a growing economy is often linked with decreasing cost 
of financial intermediation due to more competition and availability of more funds for productive 
investments. This direction of the relationship is consistent with Levine (1997, 2003ab). Third, 
foreign aid has theoretical foundations in the need to reduce the investment-financing gap less 
developed counties face (Easterly, 2005). In accordance with the narrative on investment above, 
increasing foreign aid should be positively linked to financial development. The choice of the 
control variables is in line with Asongu (2014).  
 Definitions and sources of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. The summary 
statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2 whereas the correlation analysis is provided in Appendix 3. 
The ‘summary statistics’ shows that: (i) the variables are comparable in terms of means and (ii) 
corresponding variations exhibited by the standard deviations are substantial. The latter implies 
that we can confident that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The purpose of the 
correlation matrix is to mitigate potential issues of multicollinearity. From a preliminary 
assessment, with the exceptions of financial development dynamics that are highly correlated, 
the independent variables are not characterised by high degrees of substitution. The concern of 
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multicolliinearity in the corresponding financial variables is not relevant because these are 
employed as dependent variables in distinct specifications. Moreover, as we have highlighted 
above, the choice of two variables within each financial category has been motivated by the need 
for robustness checks, notably: ensuring that findings in the banking sector are robust to those in 
financial sector, for the most part.  
 
3. 2 Methodology 
 We adopt an endogeneity-robust system Generalized Methods of Methods (GMM) as 
empirical strategy for two main reasons. First, the methodology is appropriate when the 
dependent variables are persistent. To the best our knowledge, for a system GMM technique to 
be adopted, a rule of thumb first-order autocorrelation threshold for evidence of persistence in 
the dependent variable is 0.800 (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2015). As shown in Appendix 4, the 
following are correlations between financial variables and their corresponding lagged values: 
0.981 for money supply, 0.988 for financial system deposits, 0.928 (for banking system 
efficiency), financial system efficiency (0.971), banking system activity (0.991), financial system 
activity (0.994) and financial size (0.933). Second it controls for endogeneity in all regressors. 
We employ a two-step GMM with forward orthogonal deviations instead of differencing. 
Accordingly, while the two-step approach is preferred to the one-step approach because it is 
consistent with heteroscedasticity, the use of forward orthogonal deviations which is an 
extension of  Arellano and Bover (1995) by Roodman (2009ab) has the advantages of accounting 
for cross-sectional dependence and limiting instrument proliferation (Love and Zicchino, 2006; 
Baltagi, 2008).  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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Where: tiFD ,  
is a financial development dynamic (depth, efficiency, activity or size) of country 
i
 
at  period t ;  is a constant;
 
 represents tau ;  FI , Net FDI inflows; FIFI , interaction 
between Net FDI inflows (FI) and Net FDI inflows (FI);
 
W  is the vector of control variables  
(GDP growth, inflation, public investment, foreign aid and trade openness),
 i

 
is the country-
specific effect, t  
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. In the specification, we 
prefer the two-step to the one-step procedure because it is heteroscedasticity-consistent. 
 Given that the estimation strategy entails interactive regressions, we devote some space to 
briefly engaging some pitfall of interaction regressions from Brambor et al. (2006). In essence, 
all constitutive variables should enter into the specifications. In addition, for the estimations to 
make economic sense, estimated parameters corresponding to interactive terms should be 
interpreted as conditional marginal effects. Moreover, the modifying FDI variable should be 
within the range provided by the summary statistics for the underlying marginal impact to have 
economic meaning. 
 
4. Empirical results  
 Tables 1, 2 and 3 reveal results corresponding to ‘financial depth’, ‘financial efficiency’ 
and ‘financial activity and size’ respectively. Each of the seven financial dynamics entails three 
specifications, namely, the: full sample, sub-sample with below (or equal) median FDI inflows 
(FDI≤M) and sub-sample with above-median FDI inflows (FDI>M)9. Four main information 
criteria are used to assess the validity of the estimated models. First, the null hypothesis of the 
second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected.  Second the Sargan and Hansen over-
identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are 
the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while 
the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but 
weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of 
instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in 
most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is 
                                                          
9
 Hence, for the purpose of simplicity ‘sub-sample with below-median FDI’ is used to refer to the ‘sub-sample with 
below (or equal) median FDI inflows’.  
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also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test 
for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided.  
 The following can be established in Table 1 on ‘financial globalisation dynamic 
thresholds for financial depth’. Whereas financial depth is in terms of ‘overall money supply’ in 
the left-hand-side (LHS), it is denoted as liquid liabilities or financial system deposits in the 
right-hand-side (RHS). First, we notice that the financial globalisation variables of interest are 
not significant in the RHS or financial system deposit regressions. Second, in the LHS, there is 
positive threshold evidence in the second and third specifications corresponding respectively to 
below- and above-median FDI inflows. The positive modifying thresholds are within the range 
of FDI inflows (-4.578 to 91.007) provided by the summary statistics, notably: 20.500 
(0.328/0.016) for FDI≤M and 16.00 (0.032/0.002) for FDI>M10. The former entails an increasing 
marginal effect to the positive threshold of 20.500 whereas the latter directly has a threshold 
effect of 16.00 because the underlying coefficient of 0.032 is not significant. It follows that 
relatively higher levels of FDI are required for the positive benefits of FDI in the below-median 
sub-sample. The interest of sub-dividing the full sample is apparent in the fact that estimated FDI 
coefficients are not significant in the full sample specification.   
Third, with the exception of GDP growth, the control variables have the expected signs: 
inflation negatively affects financial development, while public investment, foreign aid and trade 
openness have positive effects. The unexpected sign from GDP growth may be traceable to the 
consequences of immiserizing growth in the continent. Accordingly, situations where growing 
output is accompanied by growing poverty levels, are the result of unequal distribution of the 
fruits of economic prosperity. In such economic scenarios, most of the national wealth siphoned 
by the ruling elite is often hidden in safe tax havens abroad. Therefore, such schemes and/or 
processes of fraud evasion are very likely to negatively affect domestic financial deposits and 
money supply. Evidence of immiserizing growth is apparent in Africa because despite: (i) over 
two decades of growth resurgence (Fosu, 2015, p. 44) and (ii) the continent hosting seven of the 
ten fastest growing economies in the world (Asongu and Rangan, 2015), the April 2015 World 
Bank report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) poverty targets has revealed that 
extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of sub-
                                                          
10
 20.500 is the rewarding threshold because it represents the point where the overall impact of FDI on money 
supply becomes positive.  Accordingly: (20.50×0.016) + (-0.328) = 0.  
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Saharan Africa, where 45% of countries in the sub-region are still substantially off-track from 
attaining the MDGs extreme poverty target (World Bank, 2015).  
 
Table 1: Financial Depth and Financial Globalisation  
       
 Financial Depth 
       
 Economic Depth (Money Supply) Financial System Depth (Deposits) 
 Full Sample FDI ≤M FDI>M Full Sample FDI ≤M FDI>M 
Constant  -3.790*** 0.152 0.188 -1.389* 1.239 -6.265*** 
 (0.002) (0.907) (0.947 (0.066) (0.205) (0.001) 
Money Supply (-1) 0.990*** 1.072*** 0.904*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Financial System Deposits (-1) --- --- --- 1.035*** 1.030*** 1.037*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI -0.001 -0.328*** -0.032 0.023 -0.076 -0.002 
 (0.945) (0.000) (0.498) (0.287) (0.155) (0.940) 
FDI*FDI -0.0003 0.016*** 0.002** 0.00007 0.006 0.0008 
 (0.445) (0.005) (0.036) (0.866) (0.116) (0.423) 
GDP growth  -0.182*** -0.217*** -0.145*** -0.135*** -0.160*** -0.085*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Inflation 0.001 -0.021*** -0.060*** -0.016** -0.018*** -0.039*** 
 (0.848) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Investment  0.124*** 0.073 0.139*** 0.149*** 0.087** 0.175*** 
 (0.001) (0.242) (0.005) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  0.039*** 0.071** 0.019 0.025*** 0.001 0.045*** 
 (0.001) (0.020) (0.573) (0.003) (0.951) (0.000) 
Trade  0.061*** -0.001 0.036** 0.016** -0.008 0.056*** 
 (0.000) (0.843) (0.023) (0.045) (0.120) (0.000) 
       
AR(1) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.327) (0.279) (0.301) (0.364) (0.213) (0.353) 
Sargan OIR (0.010) (0.000) (0.094) (0.002) (0.000) (0.192) 
Hansen OIR (0.206) (0.644) (0.631) (0.213) (0.541) (0.751) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.106) (0.518) (0.118) (0.043) (0.711) (0.555) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.431) (0.615) (0.935) (0.642) (0.376) (0.728) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.330) (0.229) (0.320) (0.417) (0.325) (0.394) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.192) (0.892) (0.853) (0.148) (0.721) (0.919) 
       
Fisher  2391.28*** 9753.45*** 15592.5*** 3211.50*** 20934.5*** 252518*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  47 43 37 47 43 37 
Observations  436 220 216 436 220 216 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. M: Median of  FDI (2.6702). DHT: Difference in 
Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is 
twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
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The following findings can be established in Table 2 on ‘financial globalisation dynamic 
thresholds for financial efficiency’. Whereas there is no evidence of thresholds in the LHS or 
banking system efficiency regressions, the negative thresholds in the RHS or financial system 
efficiency are not feasible because the corresponding three specifications are not valid. 
Accordingly, rejection of the null hypotheses of the AR(2) in these specifications implies that 
autocorrelations in the residuals have not been completely eliminated. Signs of significant 
control variables are consistent with those in Table 1.  It is interesting to note that the signs of 
these control variables are opposite to those observed in the preceding table because financial 
efficiency is inversely related to financial depth. Accordingly, financial efficiency is the ability 
to transform mobilised domestic savings (or deposits) into credit for economic agents. Hence, 
increasing financial efficiency reflects decreasing financial depth or deposits.  
 
Table 2: Banking Efficiency and Financial Globalisation  
       
 Financial Efficiency 
       
 Banking System Efficiency (BcBd) Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 
 Full Sample FDI ≤M FDI>M Full Sample FDI ≤M FDI>M 
Constant  15.439*** 15.234*** 5.103 7.573*** 6.439* 9.640*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.109) (0.006) (0.085) (0.002) 
Banking System Efficiency (-1) 0.889*** 0.825*** 0.901*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Financial System Efficiency (-1) --- --- --- 0.900*** 0.914*** 0.966*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) -0.159* 0.622 -0.134 0.051 0.316 0.081 
 (0.071) (0.224) (0.203) (0.372) (0.460) (0.389) 
FDI*FDI 0.003 -0.017 -0.00008 -0.003** -0.023 -0.005*** 
 (0.101) (0.554) (0.966) (0.020) (0.343) (0.005) 
GDP growth  0.096 0.021   0.039 0.151*** 0.023 0.280*** 
 (0.045)** (0.765) (0.409) (0.007) (0.736) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.068*** 0.040*** -0.033*** 0.145*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Investment  -0.278*** -0.313** -0.333*** -0.196*** -0.128 0.018 
 (0.002) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.359) (0.833) 
Foreign Aid  -0.078*** -0.182** -0.033 -0.106*** -0.324 -0.026* 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.219) (0.000) (0.359) (0.095) 
Trade  -0.006 0.032 0.016 0.031 0.054* -0.063** 
 (0.816) (0.323) (0.412) (0.160) (0.064) (0.026) 
       
AR(1) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.447) (0.607) (0.250) 
AR(2) (0.296) (0.379) (0.109) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) 
Sargan OIR (0.065) (0.371) (0.256) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.207) (0.412) (0.278) (0.170) (0.589) (0.355) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.154) (0.396) (0.846) (0.083) (0.755) (0.652) 
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Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.354) (0.416) (0.108) (0.410) (0.402) (0.223) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.075) (0.710) (0.283) (0.099) (0.381) (0.051) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.677) (0.177) (0.348) (0.476) (0.718) (0.983) 
       
Fisher  1001.79*** 594.43*** 94865*** 839.86*** 1137.81*** 7673.05*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  47 43 37 47 43 37 
Observations  444 224 220 436 220 216 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. M: Median of  FDI (2.6702). DHT: Difference in 
Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is 
twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no 
autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
 
 Table 3 has three sets of specifications, namely: banking system activity, financial system 
activity and financial size. In the first-two sets, positive threshold evidence is only apparent for 
‘FDI≤M’ sub-samples, with corresponding thresholds within the FDI range (-4.578 to 91.007) 
disclosed by the summary statistics, notably:   13.81 (0.152/0.011) for banking system activity 
and 13.29 (0.226/0.017) for financial system activity.  
 As for financial size, there is evidence of a positive threshold (which entails increasing 
marginal effect) in the full sample and only the presence of increasing marginal effect in the 
‘FDI>M’ sub-sample. The threshold in the full sample is within range, notably: 21.30 
(0.213/0.010). Findings of the above-median sub-sample imply that: (i) FDI initially increases 
financial size and (ii) further increasing FDI has positive marginal effects. Hence, in the latter, 
FDI does not require a specific threshold in order to increase financial size. This is contrary to 
the underpinning threshold hypothesis that the financial development benefits from FDI are 
questionable until certain thresholds (or levels) in FDI are attained. In other words, we now 
witness evidence of increasing marginal returns to financial size from an initially positive FDI 
effect. It is interesting to note that so far, we have been establishing evidence of increasing 
financial (depth and activity) returns from initially negative FDI effects. The significance and 
signs of the control variables are consistent with the discourses of Tables 1-2.    
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Table 3: Financial Activity, Financial Size and Financial Globalisation  
          
 Financial Activity Financial Size 
          
 Banking System Activity (Pcrb ) Financial System Activity (Pcrbof)  
 Full Sample FDI ≤M FDI>M Full Sample FDI ≤M FDI>M Full Sample FDI ≤M FDI>M 
Constant  -2.991*** -0.119 -4.700*** -3.262*** -0.502 -6.125*** 11.558*** 17.073*** 0.241 
 (0.001) (0.871) (0.001) (0.007) (0.597) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.898) 
Banking Sys. Activity  (-1) 1.102*** 1.081*** 1.046*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Financial  Sys. Activity (-1) --- --- --- 1.127*** 1.100*** 1.056*** --- --- --- 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Financial Size (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.848*** 0.754*** 0.920*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
FDI 0.026 -0.152*** 0.001 0.030 -0.226*** -0.003 -0.213*** -0.107 0.123* 
 (0.139) (0.008) (0.970) (0.171) (0.000) (0.944) (0.000) (0.651) (0.089) 
FDI*FDI 0.000005 0.011*** -0.00009 0.0005 0.017*** 0.0006 0.010*** -0.001 0.004* 
 (0.987) (0.008) (0.897) (0.128) (0.000) (0.392) (0.000) (0.916) (0.050) 
GDP growth  -0.025** -0.039 0.012 -0.035*** -0.047 0.045 -0.063** 0.015 -0.071* 
 (0.046) (0.170) (0.504) (0.008) (0.118) (0.101) (0.013) (0.792) (0.060) 
Inflation -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.0004 -0.028*** -0.026*** 0.009 -0.032*** 0.002   0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.947) (0.000) (0.000) (0.228) (0.000) (0.828) (0.863) 
Public Investment  0.113*** 0.088** 0.101*** 0.116*** 0.105** 0.156*** 0.072* 0.198** 0.025 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.003) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.079) (0.024) (0.505) 
Foreign Aid  -0.010* -0.016 0.024** -0.024*** -0.038 0.027** -0.054*** -0.050 -0.028 
 (0.087) (0.553) (0.027) (0.004) (0.224) (0.013) (0.005) (0.335) (0.154) 
Trade  0.013** -0.006 0.030*** 0.005 -0.012 0.015 0.037* 0.048*** 0.039*** 
 (0.026) (0.212) (0.005) (0.453) (0.115) (0.265) (0.060) (0.001) (0.002) 
          
AR(1) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.035) (0.030) (0.035) (0.065) (0.076) (0.083) 
AR(2) (0.049) (0.199) (0.150) (0.053) (0.262) (0.143) (0.311) (0.346) (0.377) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.001) (0.018) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) 
Hansen OIR (0.231) (0.372) (0.529) (0.314) (0.428) (0.611) (0.396) (0.711) (0.611) 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.204) (0.236) (0.325) (0.459) (0.293) (0.441) (0.142) (0.653) (0.453) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.333) (0.503) (0.619) (0.267) (0.520) (0.628) (0.666) (0.614) (0.619) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))          
H excluding group (0.269) (0.572) (0.147) (0.257) (0.790) (0.155) (0.126) (0.745) (0.589) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.286) (0.222) (0.955) (0.447) (0.147) (0.988) (0.860) (0.493) (0.508) 
          
Fisher  3296.52*** 7544.6**** 9054.98*** 893.60*** 10728.2*** 5042.97*** 8791.1*** 1790.5*** 100227*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  47 43 37 47 43 37 47 42 37 
Observations  436 220 216 438 220 218 438 220 218 
          
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Syst: System.  M: Median of  FDI (2.6702). 
DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The 
significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject 
the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
 
5. Concluding implications and further research directions  
 As we have observed in the introduction, the policy debate has centred on either 
encouraging or discouraging capital flows into developing countries. We have motivated the 
present line of inquiry with the argument that engaging the debate exclusively from a bipolar 
perspective may be misleading in advancing scholarship on linkages between financial 
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globalisation and development outcomes. Accordingly, the effect of financial globalisation may 
be positive or negative contingent on certain thresholds of financial globalisation. Building on 
this intuition, we have investigated if the financial development benefits from financial 
globalisation are questionable until certain thresholds of financial globalisation are attained. We 
have employed all the financial intermediary development dimensions identified by the Financial 
Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank, namely: dynamics of depth 
(money supply and liquid liabilities), efficiency (at banking and financial system levels), activity 
(from banking and financial system perspectives) and size. Financial globalisation is measured 
with Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows as a percentage of GDP (FDIgdp) and the empirical 
evidence is based on: (i) Interactive Generalised Method of Moments with forward orthogonal 
deviations and (ii) data from 53 African countries for the period 2000-2011. 
The following findings have been established. First, thresholds of FDIgdp from which 
financial globalisation increases money supply are 20.50 and 16.00 for below- and above-median 
levels of financial globalisation, respectively. Second, thresholds of FDIgdp from which 
financial globalisation increases banking system activity and financial system activity for below-
median sub-samples of financial globalisation are 13.81 and 13.29 respectively. Third, for 
financial size, there is a positive threshold evidence of 21.30 in the full sample and increasing 
returns without a modifying threshold for the above-median sub-sample. It is important to note 
that a financial globalisation threshold within the context of the study is a level of FDIgdp from 
which the initially negative effect of financial globalisation on financial development becomes 
positive.  
 The above findings reconcile the two streams of the debate discussed in the Section 2. 
Accordingly, below the identified thresholds of FDI, the position/cautions of Rodrik (1998) and 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) on the questionable and/or negative relationship between 
financial globalisation and financial development is apparent. Conversely, above the identified 
thresholds, the notable optimistic stances of Fischer, Dornbusch (Fischer, 1997; Dornbusch, 
1998) and plethora of authors in the stream, is confirmed.  
The main policy implication from the findings is that the effect of financial globalisation 
on financial development though initially negative, is marginally positive with increasing 
financial globalisation. At certain thresholds of financial globalisation, the increasing financial 
development marginal returns from increasing FDIgdp change the overall effect from negative to 
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positive. It follows that financial globalisation is both negative and positive for financial 
development with a U-shaped nexus. Hence, consistent with the motivation of the inquiry, the 
appropriate role of policy should neither be to stem the tide of capital flows nor encourage them, 
but to understand what levels or thresholds of capital flows are needed to benefit domestic 
financial development.  
 The originality of this study is its extension of the debate on conditions for financial 
development benefits from financial globalisation. It has provided policy makers with levels of 
FDI (as a percentage of GDP) that are needed to start materialising the financial development 
rewards of financial globalisation. Further research devoted to improving scholarship on the 
debate may assess effects of the recent financial crisis on the established relationship by 
engaging a comparative study with pre- and post-crisis samples. Moreover, in this study we have 
conditioned the effect on the mean of the financial development dynamics. Therefore, 
investigating the established linkages throughout the conditional distributions of the financial 
development dynamics would also substantially advance the debate.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
Economic Financial Depth   M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Depth   Fdgdp Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Efficiency   BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Efficiency   FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking  System Activity  Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from financial institutions (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial Size   Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank 
assets 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial Globalisation FDI Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics  
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
 
Financial 
Development 
Economic Financial Depth (M2) 33.045 22.112 4.129 112.83 561 
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp)  26.882 20.888 1.690 97.823 561 
Banking  System Efficiency (BcBd)  68.032 29.020 14.106 171.85 606 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 73.540 37.419 13.753 260.66 561 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 18.763 17.452 0.551 86.720 561 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 20.635 23.495 0.010 149.77 563 
Financial Size (Dbacba) 74.276 22.454 2.982 99.999 602 
       
Financial  
Globalization  
FDI Net Inflows  4.981 8.194 -4.578 91.007 617 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.682 5.761 32.832 63.379 608   
Inflation 56.216 1020.10 -9.797 24411 574 
Public Investment 7.457 4.437 0 43.011 546 
Development Assistance  10.576 12.608 -0.251 147.05 615 
Trade Openness (Trade) 78.672 35.101 22.353 209.87 599   
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit 
on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit 
from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. FDI: Foreign 
Direct Investment. GDPg: GDP growth.  
22 
 
        Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size : 475) 
          
Financial Development Dynamics  Other variables  
Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size       
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Dbacba FDIgdp GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade  
1.000 0.974 0.090 0.112 0.830 0.657 0.424 -0.090 -0.093 -0.112 0.082 -0.248 0.085 M2 
 1.000 0.112 0.196 0.884 0.758 0.475 -0.086 -0.077 -0.088 0.088 -0.273 0.106 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.868 0.470 0.478 0.222 -0.209 -0.079 -0.146 -0.238 -0.155 0.159 Bcbd 
   1.000 0.563 0.714 0.228 -0.195 -0.079 -0.129 -0.213 -0.167 -0.178 FcFd 
    1.000 0.929 0.490 -0.139 -0.076 -0.109 -0.058 -0.294 0.058 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.427 -0.135 -0.075 -0.087 -0.073 -0.280 -0.003 Pcrbof 
      1.000 -0.067 0.033 -0.125 0.118 -0.349 0.241 Dbacba 
       1.000 0.358 0.104 0.152 -0.013 0.355 FDIgdp 
        1.000 -0.211 0.184 0.048 0.161 GDPg 
         1.000 -0.117 -0.018 0.043 Inflation  
          1.000 0.089 0.166 PubIvt 
           1.000 -0.217 NODA 
            1.000 Trade 
              
          M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from  
          deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. FDI:  
          Foreign Direct Investment. GDPg: GDP growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Fin: Financial.   
                                  
23 
 
Appendix 4: Persistence of the dependent variables  
        
 Financial Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrd Pcrdof Dbacba 
M2(-1) 0.9819       
Fdgdp(-1)  0.9882      
BcBd(-1)   0.9282     
FcFd(-1)    0.9717    
Pcrd (-1)     0.9912   
Pcrdof(-1)      0.9940  
Dbacba(-1)       0.9338 
        
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial 
deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from  deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial 
institutions. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. M2(-1): Lagged value of Money Supply. Fin: 
Financial.  
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